INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is now entering its second decade of existence.
1 As a young institution, the ICC is still in the process of setting norms as to its own scope and jurisdiction. Thus far, one of the key jurisdictional questions that has defied resolution is the place of complementarity in deciding whether certain criminal issues of international concern should be tried before the ICC or national tribunals? Although the Rome Statute crystallizes definitions of core international crimes that may be tried before the ICC, the process of determining whether to leave jurisdiction with the nation or allow jurisdiction to lie with the ICC continues to lack structure and appropriate guidance.
In the midst of this norm-creating and norm-setting moment in the codification of international criminal law, the ICC has, at times, set an overly high bar for the hearing of international criminal law cases. In doing so, the ICC may not only be forgoing the opportunity to prosecute alleged 431 
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Trial Chamber of the ICC recognized that the Democratic Republic of Congo was unwilling or unable to prosecute Ntaganda for the alleged war crimes, 8 leaving criminal accountability for those crimes to the mechanisms of international criminal justice. However, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber-a chamber within the ICC with the responsibility for threshold jurisdictional questions-acting without sufficient guidance, opined that the ICC was simply not the appropriate venue to try individuals such as Ntaganda. 9 Had the Pre-Trial Chamber's opinion stood, it would have legitimized the impunity of Ntaganda and cemented the precedent of a narrow jurisdiction at the ICC, and that would enable the impunity of others like Ntaganda. 10 Had that occurred, it would have indicated a lost opportunity for the ICC, nations interested in prosecuting war crimes, and the international community as a whole. This Article seeks, in part, to enable discourse on how to broaden ICC's jurisdiction through means at both the domestic and internationallevels.
11
Part I analyzes the problem of the current trajectory of the ICC with regard to its jurisdictional scope. Looking at the development of transnational and international responses to atrocity crimes, including its burst of development in the last twenty-five years, this article recognizes that the Rome Statute was drafted with the intention of covering a broader range of cases than the ICC is currently handling. The intended scope includes the prosecution of alleged war criminals who were at senior, midlevel, and lower levels of authority in committing grave crimes. However, the potential scope of the ICC to reach such actors has been progressively narrowed since the inception of the Rome Statute due to prosecutorial discretion and resource constraints at the international level. This problem is exemplified by the 2006 Pre-Trial Chamber decision not to issue a warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda, a high-ranking alleged war criminal in the Democratic Republic of Congo; this is rectified, in part, by the ICC Appeal Chamber's review of that decision. Part I also addresses how national courts have failed to live up to their international obligations in not defining gravity 12 broadly so as to encourage the ICC to find that the 8. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, '1!40. 9. Id. '1!89. 10. See infra notes 65-70 for the Appeals' response. 11. The matter of Bosco Ntaganda' s case at the ICC is discussed in more detail infra in Part I.C.
12. While the terms "grave" and "gravity" were used often throughout the twentieth century in the context of describing the harms that the international community sought to prevent, the terms did not require precision until their use created a jurisdictional trigger for [Vol. 23:3 prosecution ofNtaganda and others who are similarly situated are within its jurisdiction. Part II considers the historical context of international criminal justice in two respects. First, it reviews efforts at establishing extra-national criminal justice mechanisms and notes that, historically, effective development of transnational legal processes has depended on nations engaging in norm-setting dialogue that has strengthened and underpinned international criminal justice mechanisms by giving meaning to the definitions used by international tribunals and the scope of those tribunals' work. Second, it argues that the jurisdictional narrowing currently occurring at the ICC is not a new phenomenon, but instead, it reflects a historical pattern of the international community attempting to define the jurisdiction of international criminal processes broadly, only to see those processes narrowed and limited over time. As such, the current narrowing of jurisdiction puts the ICC at the brink of lost opportunity to make permanent an institution that can be truly effective in prosecuting and deterring atrocity cnmes.
Part III analyzes the slow process and the confusion in the development of the law divided by the roles of the Office of the Prosecutor, the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber. The Article suggests further development at the domestic level in order to set broader jurisdictional norms for the ICC, which the ICC would then be permitted under the Rome Statute to consider.
13
This Article concludes by suggesting a new normative framework to ensure that the ICC can defy historical patterns and live up to its potential. In particular, this Article recommends that States Parties to the Rome Statute engage further in transnational legal processes with regard to the question of complementarity. By engaging in interaction, debate, and discourse, States Parties can enable a broader understanding of what constitutes gravity within national courts, thereby engaging in positive norm-setting that resonates with the ICC as it continues to build the architecture for its own determinations of jurisdiction. Such a process would support efforts to allow for an interpretation of those crimes that would give guidance to victim groups, world leaders, and the world community such that binding internalization of norins would work toward the ultimate goal of protecting vulnerable populations. 433 
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I. THE NARROWING SCOPE OF ICC's JURISDICTION
The ICC is still in the early phases of its development. As such, its norms with regard to questions of jurisdiction are still malleable and open to interpretation. Yet the current trends suggest that the ICC's jurisdiction has narrowed significantly from what was envisioned by the Rome Statute. National courts are not picking up the slack and prosecuting atrocity crimes. As a result of these two trends, the ICC is now at risk of falling far short of what the framers of and signatories to the Rome Statute intended.
A. The Rome Statute and Complementarity
In recent years, a number of cases relating to international criminal law have focused on genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (together referred to as "atrocity crimes").
14 The cases vary depending on the situation: some cases and situations are before the ICC, a permanent institution with broad prospective jurisdiction over atrocity crimes. 15 At the same time, a number of ad hoc international institutions have been created to deal with specific post-conflict situations such as the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 16 [d] etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes ...").
16. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 to create a mechanism for accountability over the war crimes and atrocities that occurred in the early 1990s in the various conflicts occurring in the former Yugoslavia. See 17. See G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/228 (May 27, 2003) (The Extraordinary Chambers of the Court of Cambodia is most accurately characterized as a hybrid tribunal since it is a national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations. It is staffed by national and international judges and applies international laws. Its mandate includes trying former Khmer Rouge members for war crimes and atrocities committed in Cambodia during the 1970s.).
18. See S.C. Res 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established by the United Nations and Sierra Leone as a hybrid entity-a national court that was created in a coordinated effort with the United Nations, is staffed by
[Vol. 23:3 places engage in domestic interpretations of international law and the nature of atrocity crimes.
21
The most basic common thread among all of these aforementioned courts is their goal of seeking accountability for the worst crimes offending ethnic and national societies as well as the international community. The work of these courts should be considered as national and international in nature, 22 since they address crimes and actions that both the international and national communities would like to punish and deter in the future. In order to be effective at this work and to maintain legitimacy at both levels, courts must rely on both national and international mechanisms of prevention. 23 The aspiration of this multi-level system is that those who committed atrocity crimes -whether as senior leaders of a group, mid-level authorities or lower level operatives -can be prosecuted and held accountable for their actions.
24
The difficulty arises in that international and national mechanisms have different strengths, limits, and, to a certain extent, deontological purposes. The Rome Statute 25 creates the ICC as a body independent from national and international judges, and applies international laws. Its purpose is to try those accused of atrocity crimes and war crimes committed during the internal conflicts in Sierra Leone that began in 1996. 21. The obligation of national courts to function on two levels -both domestic and international-is discussed in Part I.C. See infra pp.l4-18.
22. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (recognizing that the States Parties to the Rome Statute are " [d] etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.").
23. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl ("Affirming-that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation .. .");see also While a state, in dealing with harms occurring within that state's jurisdiction, may take measures at a national level through legislation, administrative mandate, or judicial action, in any case, it would continue to act as the state. As such, the state may be placing the interest of the state ahead of 'justice," which is sometimes amorphous and uneasily defined.
27
In those circumstances, the potential exists for interference in the judicial processes of the state by parts of the state apparatus seeking to prevent prosecution of crimes for political reasons or otherwise.
28
The Rome Statute attempts to account for that concern with its provisions on complementarity and admissibility by striking a balance and allowing the States Parties to take the lead on prosecuting atrocity crimes by making the following inadmissible to the ICC: (1) the state that has jurisdiction over the case is investigating or prosecuting the crime; (2) the investigating or prosecuting state is unwilling or unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution; or (3) after an investigation, the state with jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute, but the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state to genuinely prosecute; and (4) the case does not have sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court. 2 Other scholars focus on the obligation of national courts to prosecute atrocity crimes, noting the possible obligation to implement the laws against international crimes "subject to the ICC's jurisdiction in their national laws and furthermore to establish extra-territorial, universal jurisdiction which enables their national criminal courts to adjudicate these crimes even if they have been committed abroad by a foreign national. " 33 Even states that do not recognize an obligation on the part of States Parties to incorporate those criminal provisions into their internal law have frequently adopted the language of the Rome Statute to increase the state's ability to cooperate with the ICC, both in support of the Rome Statute and, potentially, to enforce decisions taken by the Security Council.
34
If the ICC fails to use this norm-setting moment in the codification of 31. By antagonistic complementarity, I reference the theory that the ICC will serve to shame and blame states that fail to properly prove willingness and ability to prosecute crimes. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 (citing A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 353 (OUP, Oxford 2003), stating as one of complementarity's chief merits "the indirect but powerful incentive to [national courts] becoming more operational and effective, inherent in the power of the ICC to substitute for national judges, whenever they are not in a position to dispense justice or they deliberately fail to do so [ ...] ."); see also Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1, 51 (2009) ("The primary role that the ICC was expected to play in post-conflict states parties was to spur domestic prosecution of known perpetrators to avoid the perceived loss of face and sovereignty costs of having the ICC pursue those prosecutions internationally."). This is distinct from the concept of (1) negative complementarity, which does not of necessity seek compliance through a shaming mechanism, but only empowers the ICC to act where there is a lack of action by national courts, and (2) positive complementarity, which looks to the ICC to engage with states that otherwise would have jurisdiction to further enable those states to prosecute alleged crimes.
32. See e.g., Jann K. 35 to expand on protections to those subject to atrocity crimes, States Parties seeking to avoid the time, expense, and political repercussions of their own prosecutions would have a strong argument that domestic prosecutions would engage in overreach. The expansion of international criminal law represented by the creation of the ICC would, in effect, make way at this early stage for the contraction of international criminal justice.
B. The Gravity Standard Since the Inception ofthe International Criminal Court
In negotiating the Rome Treaty during the 1990s, drafters drew much of the language defining the particular underlying crimes over which the ICC would have jurisdiction from recent precedent: the Convention on the Prevention 40. The transnational legal process engaged in after each of these conflicts is discussed in detail in Part II infra.
(responding to previous problems of which we have become aware from recent experience) as opposed to developing best responses for the problems that we have today or are likely to face prospectively, much of the discussion has focused on the application of general principles of criminal law regarding rights of the accused, the application oflex lata 41 at a time of legal development, and interpretation of treaty provisions in a strict sense such that the defendant benefits from any confusion in the law of the ICC.
42
While this incrementalism and limited scope may give comfort to States Parties signing the Rome Statute that smaller steps will prevent surprise and allow for the Office of the Prosecutor to develop clear and cogent theories of a fairly narrow reading of the case, this very behavior undermines some of the purpose of the ICC. 43 Further, based on the observed difficulty of prosecution by an international tribunal, criminal trials undertaken by individual states may suffer from every structural and procedural weakness of the ICC, but without the perceived autonomy or international legitimacy (in many cases) that the ICC has.
44
C. The Case ofBosco Ntaganda and the ICC's Problematically Narrow Jurisdiction
The difficulties are best seen in considering norm development within the ICC's structure. [Vol. 23:3
arrest. 53 The Pre-Trial Chamber then set a standard that matched the Prosecution's own prioritization of cases using a gravity standard, 54 "that, as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes." 55 Therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber set up a definition of a gravity threshold for admissibility based on the language of the Rome Statute that asked three questions, all of which had to be answered affirmatively for the case to be considered admissible. 56 First, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked whether the conduct alleged was "systematic" or occurred on a "large scale." 57 The next question was whether the potential defendant can be considered a "senior leader" in committing the alleged war crimes. 58 The final element was consideration of whether the role played by the potential defendant warranted admissibility to the ICC. any case arising from an investigation before the Court will meet the gravity threshold provided for in article 17(1)(d) of the Statute if the following three questions can be answered affirmatively: i) Is the conduct which is the object of a case systematic or large scale (due consideration should also be given to the social alarm caused to the international community by the relevant type of conduct)?; ii) Considering the position of the relevant person in the State entity, organisation or armed group to which he belongs, can it be considered that such person falls within the category of most senior leaders of the situation under investigation?; and iii) Does the relevant person fall within the category of most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible, considering (1) the role played by the relevant person through acts or omissions when the State entities, organisations or armed groups to which he belongs commit systematic or large-scale crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (2) enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen into the FPLC, and causing them to participate in active hostilities, caused social alarm; the Pre-Trial Chamber looked at the scale of the conduct and found it to be regional instead of national and, therefore, not widespread.
60 The Pre-Trial Chamber then concluded that Ntaganda's role in the organization as third in command of the military wing meant that he had little control over the political wing of the organization and that his responsibilities were more limited than the most senior leaders of the organization. 61 Finally, the PreTrial Chamber considered Ntaganda's inability to sign agreements binding the political organization 62 and the lack of social alarm at his acts 63 showed that his arrest would not serve as a deterrent to other leaders. Because of these findings, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the requested warrant of arrest and concluded that the prosecutor should focus its efforts on others who were the most senior leaders.
64
The Appeals Chamber 65 pointed out numerous flaws in the Pre-Trial Chamber's analysis. First, it noted that Ntaganda was deeply involved with the recruiting of child soldiers, that the war crime with which he was charged did not require it be widespread, and that there was nothing in the Rome Statute that would allow for the subjective "social alarm test" that the Pre-Trial Chamber applied. 66 Second, the Appeals Chamber concluded that failing to arrest Ntaganda would put a large number of alleged criminals on notice that they need not fear arrest, even for serious crimes. 67 Under the Rome Statute, this deterrent effect is one of the purposes of maintaining a broad scope for admissibility of cases similar to that of Ntaganda. 68 Third, even if Ntaganda was not the most senior leader in this conflict, lower and mid-level operatives sometimes are (and should be) arrested to help build a case against the most senior leaders. 69 The Pre-Trial Chamber failed to 60. PTC I Warrants Decision, supra note 7, ' 1!' \f 72, 84 (UPC/FPLC was merely a regional group operating only in the Ituri region.). [Vol. 23:3 acknowledge or apply these purposes of the Rome Statute.
70
The potential effect of the initial failure to prosecute in the Ntaganda case may be profound. First, there was a ripple effect on other situations being considered for admissibility to the ICC. The decision not to prosecute Ntaganda led to the expansion of a loophole created by an agreement with the government of Uganda in 2003 in another case. 71 Second, from a normsetting perspective, the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision not to prosecute gave rise to the practice of the ICC not prosecuting perpetrators other than those few most responsible. Indeed, in issuing a decision for the warrant of arrest ofOmar al-Bashir, 72 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I noted in 2009 that the flawed test offered in the Ntaganda case was still the only standard for consideration by the ICC, presuming the ICC considered it appropriate to determine the admissibility of a case on gravity grounds.
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D. Domestic Courts and International Legal Obligations
The failure of the ICC to act in cases like that of Ntaganda is exacerbated by the lack of top-down pressure on domestic courts to prosecute, the failure of domestic courts to fulfill their international obligations, and the failure of State Parties to engage in transnational interaction and discussion regarding harms in violation of international principles and the adoption by states of mechanisms for the vindication of human rights. Adding to these shortcomings, the purported sanctioning tools of negative complementarity failed to provide a remedy to at risk populations.
Lack ofTop-Down Pressure
Unfortunately, the same standards that lead to compliance pull may evidence the limits on complementarity's applicability. An ability to comply with the letter of the law -here, the terms of the Rome Statute -'may undermine some purposes of international criminal law. Prosecutorial discretion allows States Parties wide latitude to refuse to try cases, and states are not under significant pressure to reach beyond the highest level offenders in their prosecutorial decisions.
In determining whether States Parties have complied with their international obligations to prosecute, the ICC first looks to the terms of the Rome Statute, 74 the Elements of Crimes, 75 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
76 Second, the ICC looks to applicable treaties other than the Rome Statute, and principles and rules of international law including established principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. 77 Lastly, only absent general principles of international law, the ICC considers principles derived from national laws of legal systems of the world, where those laws are not inconsistent with the Rome Statute, or with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 78 Notwithstanding and separate from these recognized sources of law, the ICC may apply interpretations of principles and rules of law from its own previous decisions, which one might presume would not conflict with the Rome Statute or other international standards of international criminallaw. 79 None of these mechanisms put a significant amount of pressure on domestic courts to fulfill their international obligations.
Transnational Legal Processes
Were national courts more actively describing their own understanding of the core crimes, similar to the analyses that must be made in considering potential prosecutions by the ICC, there would be greater interaction among parties trying to achieve the goal of ending impunity, and helping to determine a causal law that might prevent harm to populations 74. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1)(a) (lex specialis relating to statutory interpretation ofiCC-instituted International Criminal Law).
75. 77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 2l(l)(b). 78. Id. art. 2l(l)(c). The drafters compromised further by stating that "general principles oflaw derived by the Court from national laws oflegal systems of the world include[s], as appropriate, the national laws of the States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime ...." Id. Although such a reading might prevent harm to the accused under the nulla poena sine lege standard, in that the accused might have greater awareness of the illegality of an act under, for example, national or territorial jurisdiction of a particular state, the Conference of the ICC Statute "rejected the view of some delegations that the phrase 'including, as appropriate' should be replaced with 'especially'." COMMENTARY, supra note 24, at 703. Thus, the laws of the state that would normally exercise jurisdiction have no presumptive authority greater than other national laws oflegal systems of the world.
79. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
caused by atrocity crimes. Taking a transnational legal process approach, 80 national representatives have in previous contexts adopted or recognized existing principles under international law norms, 81 met in groups to discuss implementation of international law standards, 82 and have pushed for the internalization of those standards within a transnational, supranational, or international structure. 83 The concern over restrictive standards undermining the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, and the principles of law the Statute supports, could be raised in the selection and prosecution of a number of cases and 80. Harold Hongju Koh describes the transnational legal process as having three phases: One or more transnational actors provoke an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal normative system. The aim is to 'bind' that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set. Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The transaction generates a legal rule, which will guide future transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the process. 81. See, e.g., MANUALOFTHELAWSOFWARONLAND(Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihVINTR0/140?0penDocument (noting that the Institute of International Law "believes it is fulfilling a duty in offering to the governments a 'Manual' suitable as the basis for national legislation in each State, and in accord with both the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies ... [and, in not trying to add new law, the Institute] contented itself with stating clearly and codifying the accepted ideas of our age so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable." Id. at Preface (describing this facet of transnational legal process as interacting from a positivist (or objective law) perspective)).
82. See Robert 0. Keohane, Jr., Institutional Theory and Realist Challenge after the Cold War, in NEOREALISM & NEOLIBERALISM 269 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (describing this facet of transnational legal process as interpreting the standards in specific contexts through commissions or other institutions). This is an institutionalized perspective that eventually looks to the International Law Commission or its committees for guidelines as to the development of the ICC.
83. This could be described as a constructivist approach-determining the constitution ofrules related to the identified norms, and allowing for the further implementation of norms through that construct. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52(4) INT'L ORG. 855, 871 (1988) (noting that "Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity-that is to say, they specifY what counts as that activity."). Considering the usurpation of authority a potential indicator of overall governmental incapacity or specific complicity with the alleged crime suggests an incentive for state governments to make every effort to retain authority over adjudication. 85 In doing so, however, the state tribunals need not behave as though exercising powers delegated to the States by the ICC, and therefore limited to the interpretation of those powers by the ICC. Rather, to the extent the articulation of specific crimes by the ICC reflects jus cogens forbidding atrocity crimes, 86 the adoption and implementation by states of the ICC statute creates an opportunity for states to define the jurisprudence of international criminal law in conjunction with the ICC statute.
The Decoupling ofState Actors' Roles and Redoubling ofa State Actors ' Efforts
The lack of transnational legal process is not the only obstacle to positive norm-setting on the national level. In addition, States Parties are failing to live up to their own obligation to act on two levels and with two purposes: on the national and international level; and with the dual purposes of 1) enforcing domestic norms and 2) informing and enriching international norms in the process.
The concept of jus cogens or "compelling law" that allows no derogation is a kindred spirit to the notion of le droit des gens, or "the law of people" described by French law professor and original member of the UN International Law Commission Georges Scelle. 87 In Scelle' s Precis du droit des gens, he cites to Montesquieu's definition that "Laws are 84 . See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 43, at 371; see generally Schabas, supra note 4. 85. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317-18 ("Complementarity. bestows upon national proceedings the pedigree of 'willingness' and 'ability' when the Court determines that a case is inadmissible in accordance with Article 17(1)(a) to (c) of the Statute."); id. at 320 (discussing the "largely antagonist premise on which the regime of complementarity is based ... [where States] want to avoid the embarrassment that a declaration of admissibility would entail.").
86. necessary relationships which derive from the nature of things," to lead to the concept of a law of integration and progress leading to "objective law." 88 Because this objective law conforms to social necessities, positive law that derogates from objective law-that fails to conform to those social necessities -becomes anti-legal, and may be rejected. 89 Binding positive law gains its validity from the bundle of conditions necessary for the existence of a social fact, without which the social fact could neither come about nor persist. 90 These purported causal laws that support social functioning are not necessarily enunciated as positive law, but are the basis around which legislators might construe and assess positive law. In the context of international, supranational, and extra-national relations, actions taken by state actors "are by nature international, since their goal, and result, is to realize this phenomenon of [legal monist] solidarity or international relations, and they are, and can only be, accomplished in conformity to international norms."
92 While the state actors could, therefore, act from a national or international perspective, and where there exist no specifically international leaders or agents, the state leaders and agents that stand in for the specifically international leaders/agents take on a "double role."
93 They are national agents and leaders when they function in the state juridical order; they are international agents and leaders when they act in the international juridical order. 94 Scelle describes thisdedoublement fonctionnel -as the fundamental law of the uncoupling of functions, but most describe it as "role splitting."
95
In the context of complementarity before the ICC, some have posited that instead of having to uncouple a national and international function, the national court and the international court exist in a relation of role concurrence -in the first instance, the national court may take jurisdiction over the trial of an alleged perpetrator of an atrocity crime, but the international court will exercise its role in prosecuting the perpetrator when the national court's failure to prosecute activates the international court's concurrent jurisdiction. 96 Because they both may take responsibility for the ., 1999) . While the concept of role concurrence is, indeed, a departure from Scelle's construct, it would appear less a departure in translating dedoublement as uncoupling -that is, each state that acts in the international community necessarily acts through its organs in both domestic and international spheres. Where law exists in the international sphere and international courts do not exist or are otherwise unable to implement that law, the courts of the state act to fulfill the obligations of the state. Because such courts are applying binding international standards on behalf of the state, the courts must uncouple the two roles that of state court with that of international court. The court doing otherwise would be anti-legal, undermining an international rule of law. See, e.g., Scelle, supra note 88, at 657:
If the connection of juridical situations puts into play the competence of government actors of other states, or actors with concurrent responsibility, the role of government actors careful to procure the realization of law in a prosecution, the international and national courts would share the role of preventing and punishing atrocity crimes.
97
The potential for shared jurisdiction may deviate from the notion of a concurrent role as opposed to a shared role. To the extent that national courts have a responsibility to vindicate supranational or meta-nationae 8 harms arising from atrocity crimes, the role is certainly not dissimilar from that exercised by the ICC -both the ICC and national courts are prosecuting alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Realistically, however, crimes vindicated by the ICC must be limited qualitatively and quantitatively by virtue of limited jurisdiction and resources, as well as concerns for sovereign control over criminal justice matters. 99 As such, the national courts have an opportunity to revisit the goal of what Scelle would refer to as the underlying "objective law," to determine which cases can and should be prosecuted by the national courts, even where the ICC would elect not to prosecute or would find the case inadmissible for lack of recognized interstate milieu will consist of a coercive act exercised on their governmental actor colleagues to obtain from them the regular utilization of their competences. See also id. at 667:
We are preoccupied with intervention only in international relations. But we know as well that there's no divider between an internal juridical order and the international juridical order: the extent of the latter determines the structure of the fonner, and when the competence of subjects oflaw, including nationals in interstate commerce, are covered by an international norm, the application of this norm stems from international law, even in relations between the governing and the governed, immediate subjects of the law of people. 97. This shared responsibility echoes the logic of the Responsibility to Protect, in that the state would have primacy over the international community, but the international community may need to act to put an end to crimes against humanity (including the crime of persecution through ethnic cleansing), genocide, or war crimes. 98. "Meta-national" refers to the community of peoples, and the joint interest of the nation of nations, as opposed to any smaller group that may have bilateral or other smaller group commonalities at a level hierarchically superior to the nation (supranational). See KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 316 (claiming state promotion of matter from a national to the international realm ensures and protects "meta-national values, such as peace, human dignity and the needs of all mankind," in describing gradual development toward a "universal" law of the world community).
99. Schabas, supra note 4, at 542, 544 (noting that there are simply not enough resources for international criminal tribunals to aspire to prosecute all international crimes within their jurisdiction, and that the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court explains the choice of situations selected by referencing the "gravity" of the situation). 2013] DEFYING GRAVITY gravity. 100 The role of the national court is, in the first instance, a greater role, because it may act without the strictures and limitations of the Rome Statute to prosecute perpetrators in a manner that effectively protects its populations prior to the ICC considering admissibility under a complementarity regime.
None of this suggests that national courts should elect to use substantially different national standards over international standards; rather, because of the deontological differences in the international and domestic tribunals and the fact that international standards require different duties of international courts than of national courts, the use of international standards in the investigation and punishment of crimes against humanity by courts should and must be done differently in domestic tribunals than in international tribunals.
101 Even in approaching the same end, the complementarity regime and the history of the development of the atrocity crimes demand a different approach of national courts.
Why Negative Complementarity Fails to Offer Sufficient Incentives to Ensure Enforcement
Many commentators have considered the utility of the ICC from the perspective of negative complementarity. 102 In considering the object and purpose of the Rome Statute, negative complementarity is the ability of the ICC to initiate an investigation only after the state that would otherwise have jurisdiction has failed to do so. 103 It is imperative to look at the goal of the international community and the roles of the state and the ICC in that process. The goal of the international community is the protection of human lives from the harms of aggressive war, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. However, these goals are not achieved when the ICC and the national courts and governments working complementary to each other, are on somewhat independent spheres under a negative complementarity framework.
One theory supporting the framework of negative complementarity focuses on the principle of domestic interest in several ways: first, in promoting a positive world perception of the state's judiciary and its 100. One might reference this as a "redoublement fonctionnel," or a functional redoubling of the state actor's efforts-exercising a metanational responsibility that the state could have chosen to opt out of, for the purpose of vindicating a core international responsibility.
1 general capacity and support for the rule of law over anti-legal. government acts or actors; 104 second, the state's interest in maintaining its sovereignty over matters arguably within its domestic sphere, as opposed to yielding sovereignty over certain criminal matters to an extra-national court; and third, the application of the underlying laws for which the extra-national court complements the state apparatus.
These justifications for relying on a negative complementarity framework are predicated on the state's negative reaction to public censure or to an extra-national sense that an act by the state breaches an international obligation. Negative complementarity presumes that the state might take action to avoid its control over a situation being undermined, and that the state's reaching an agreement with the international community on the extent of the underlying laws -whether ultimately under state or international jurisdiction -will somehow undercut state interests. Negative complementarity at its heart suggests that the state will do all in its power to prevent the assertion of authority by the complementing body 105 and, therefore, assumes that prosecution of many levels of alleged war criminals will take place at the state level in order to prevent extra-national control and influence.
On the international level, negative complementarity also assumes that the ICC will do all in its power to prosecute an alleged atrocity crime perpetrator if the state will not. However, as previously discussed, from the perspective of limited resources, prosecutorial discretion, and a lack of norm-setting guidance toward a scope broad enough to encompass such crime, the ICC has not thus far lived up to its potential in this regard.
More importantly, and not considered fully in the negative complementarity discourse, the role of the national tribunal can and should be broader than that of the international tribunal, where the state is willing and able to pursue a case against an alleged perpetrator. History shows that the development of the laws on atrocity crimes has been most successful when leaders were communicating with each other and, unfortunately, when their populations were impacted by the atrocities. 106 While the 104. See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 317 ("There is no need for international adjudicative fora if, and when, national courts can adequately achieve effective adjudication , that local courts in Sierra Leone acquire additional capacity prior to the determination of the international community's referring matters back to the state by limiting the longevity of the Special Court, implicitly recognizing a lack of capacity at the state level)).
105. KLEFFNER, supra note 2, at 320 ("for the first time in the history of international criminal law, State Parties have agreed ex ante that this failure [to adequately investigate and prosecute core crimes within its jurisdiction] will entail a concrete legal consequence: States forfeiting the claim to exercise jurisdiction, including over their own nationals and officials.").
106. See deGuzman, supra note 12, at 20-22 (arguing that the development of laws international court and the national court may have the same ultimate goal of responding to an objective law relating to the prevention of atrocity crimes, the roles ofthe courts differ. One failure of the international tribunal is the institutionalization of its voice and the impact of its interpretation. The example of the prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda illustrates the point.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH ATROCITY CRIMES
To understand the development of international criminal law's focus on atrocity crimes through a transnational legal process lens, we must start where the nations focusing on atrocities are interacting. By looking at responses to wars, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, we can see the slow, but continuing, process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of the socil:ll mitigation of war crimes, aggression, and crimes against humanity.
107
This series of negotiations, accords, and conventions reveals two important lessons for current efforts at supporting a broad jurisdiction for international criminal justice mechanisms. First, the transnational discourse has been and can be an effective means of building state-level consensus as to norm-setting. From a transnational legal process perspective, these postconflict interactions among states with regard to the rights and obligations of occupying powers in late nineteenth century and twentieth century Europe offer important parallels to our contemporary questions as to how state-level discourse can act as a norm-setting mechanism vis-a-vis the rights and obligations of international tribunals.
Second, the history reveals a striking pattern that persists today of an initial post-conflict push toward international criminal norms that would allow for broad prosecution of war crimes, only to have state-level insecurities lead to the narrowing of the scope of the international legal standards, a smaller number of prosecutions, and the resulting diminution of the initially sought-after accountability and deterrent effect.
addressing atrocity crimes stemmed from atrocities suffered during World War II, and that subsequent development occurred after the mass atrocities occurring in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).
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A. The 1874 Brussels Conference 108
Following the Franco-Prussian War, fifteen European states gathered to discuss the laws of war, some of which had been violated during the course of the relatively brief, but bloody, conflict. 109 In considering a transnational legal process approach, the interaction of the states most affected by the war raised questions as to the proper approach to the treatment ofwar crimes. For example, the states had to address whether an occupying power such as Prussia had the right to defend itself against guerilla warfare by the militia-like francs-tireurs, 110 and the mass conscription of French citizens who were not regular soldiers, or whether these French citizens who acted in defense of their country deserved prisoner-of-war status.
The fifteen states utilized the code developed during the United States Civil War by Francis Lieber 111 in an attempt to develop an "International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War." By building on the Lieber Code, which in turn relied on a number of seventeenth and eighteenth century European laws of armed conflict theorists, the leaders hoped to set stricter guidelines for warfare and post-conflict accountability mechanisms, as Lieber's code purported to be "strictly guided by the principles ofjustice, honor, and humanity." 110. Francs-tireurs, literally, "free shooters," were men living in eastern France who trained with high quality rifles and were sometimes affiliated with the French army. When franc-tireurs were captured, Prussians did not wish to treat them as captured enemy soldiers because the free-shooters did not dress in uniform or fight with an organized group.
111. The code was entitled, "Instructions for the Government all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severe punishment shall be preferred." 114 The interactive response of several nations to the perceived violation of rights in the Franco-Prussian War allowed the parties to develop a shared standard and joint interpretation of the Lieber Code and of the laws and customs of war more generally. The transnational nature of this enterprise marked a significant advance in the international discussion of the prosecution of war crimes.
The parties adopted the International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War but did not create a binding convention. Thus, they did not bind themselves through positive law. Notwithstanding the failure to create a convention, one delegate suggested that states coordinate their internal legislation to ensure equal punishment for those violating the rules of war.
115 Perhaps due to a reluctance to cede a significant responsibility with regard to criminal justice to a larger decision-making body, 116 this suggestion was not acted upon, leaving the parties' interpretation on the table at the end of the Brussels Conference.
Regardless of the reason, these countries had come together following a conflict to consider parameters to behaviors of belligerents during time of war, seeldng to prevent the negative consequences of other states' overstepping those parameters. In so doing, the states came much closer to holding themselves accountable and created a framework from which to work in the future to define limits of warfare.
B. The Oxford Manual of1880
Notwithstanding the failure of the Brussels Declaration to be made into a convention, the Lieber Code was not without impact. , 1880 ), available at http:/ /www.icrc. org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns:fliNTR0/140?0penDocument&redirect=O. The preface to the Manual notes that it does not seek an international treaty laying out the laws of war, which the authors acknowledge "might perhaps be premature or at least very difficult to obtain," but that the Manual "strengthens the discipline which is the strength of armies; it also ennobles their patriotic mission in the eyes of the soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the rights of humanity." Jd. at Preface.
are at the same time offenses against the general criminal law, the perpetrator should be tried and punished by the courts of the injured adversary: "the offending parties should be punished, after a judicial hearing, by the belligerent in whose hands they are ... [with the ] offenders against the laws of war [being] liable to the punishments specified in the penal or criminal law," when the person ofthe offender could be secured.
119
The articulation of this standard in 1880, which would. be repeated in a second Oxford Manual of 1913, 120 would have a strong effect on the rules agreed to by the victorious powers that would be able to claim almost thirty years of recognition of the standard prior to seeking to apply it. As states sought consensus on the legal rights of states to prosecute war criminals, even those concerned with ex post facto laws recognized the right of the injured belligerent to prosecute the captured enemy under its own laws, the standard articulated by the International Law Institute's 1880 and 1913 Oxford Manuals.
121
C. The Hague Conference of1899
Twenty-five years after the Brussels Conference, Europe and other states again gathered to reach a consensus in regards to the regulation of the laws and customs of war.
122 In June 1899, the Hague Diplomatic Conference revisited topics covered in the Brussels Declaration, including the legality of acts between occupying powers and citizens of the occupied state.
Belgium, a smaller nation only recognized in 1830, was concerned that its sovereignty might be overrun by transnational norms created by more powerful states. It was particularly concerned that rights recognized in the Brussels Declaration granted too great a power to an occupying force and forbade the recognition of civilians as lawful combatants when fighting 123 As opposed to codifying such a standard, the Belgian delegate argued, "In my opinion, there are certain points which cannot be made the object of a convention, and which would be better to leave as they stand today, under the rule of the tacit and common law which results from principles ofthe law ofnations."
124
In interpreting the language of the Brussels Declaration, the Belgian delegate recognized that the agents of the various states were interpreting and, potentially, codifying a standard that the representatives of smaller states could not support, because of the power recognized in states more likely through military strength (and in recent past experience) to occupy those smaller states. 125 The Belgian delegate reframed the question so that the Conference would not decide the legality or illegality of a particular act during war; rather, the Conference would determine whether new law would be needed as part of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (later known as the Hague Conventions), limiting harms that could be perpetrated by either party.
126
Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens served as a delegate from Russia, one of the Great Powers, which supported the principles recognizing rights in occupying powers. When the parties had reached an impasse as to the balance of power between international and domestic control of war crimes issues, Martens provided the following clause (later known as the Martens Clause) for adoption:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. They declare that it is in this sense especially that Articles 1 and [Vol. 23:3 2 of the Regulations must be understood.
127
The Belgian delegation supported this limiting language as a major check on potential occupying powers: "[t]omorrow, as today, the rights of the conqueror, far from being unlimited, will be restrained by the laws of public conscience (conscience universelle) and not one country, not one general would dare to transgress them, since that would submit oneself to banishment from the civilized nations."
128 Notwithstanding arguments over the accuracy of this characterization, the Conference sidestepped the specific dispute and reached agreement on a broader point. The States Parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 internalized not the right to engage in patriotic resistance to an occupying force, nor a standard for the applicable legal authority held by an occupying power, but the legal norm recognizing the place of laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience alongside the (non-conflicting) terms of the treaty.
129 By shifting the interaction -the question of what law the parties sought to reach agreement on -the interpretation and internalization of the norm became much broader, focusing on the process for legal interpretation rather than the primary law that would directly recognize authority in occupiers. 129. Indeed, Cassese references the speech made by Martens after Martens tabled his proposal of the clause: "Il ... faut se rappeler que ces dispositions [on lawful combatants and mass conscription (levee en masse)] n'ont pas pour objet de codifier tous les cas qui pourraient se presenter." ("We must recall that the object of these clauses is not to codify every eventuality that could present itself."). Id. at n.l8. Despite Cassese's (and Martens') view that the clause was meant to deal only with these two aspects of guerilla warfare, the defense of the limitations on the clause make the very point raised by the Belgian delegatethe smaller states could continue to look to custom and general principles in response to the overwhelming force of an occupying power.
130 132 The Commission investigated the causes of war and evaluated the ability of the several Allied powers to create a tribunal appropriate to try offenders against the laws and customs of war. 133 It distinguished this responsibility from that of the development of an put beyond challenge the existence of principles of international law which residually served, with current effect, to govern military conduct by reference to the 'principles of humanity and ... the dictates of public conscience."') One should also note Martens' own investment in, and his reminder to his colleagues regarding, the Conference's successfully codifying some of the standards the Brussels Declaration had failed to codify. Czar Alexander II had convened the 1874 Brussels Conference, and Czar Nicholas II convened the 1899 Hague Conference, such that Martens reminded his colleagues that the failure of the diplomatic community to agree on specific treaty rules for a second time would show the military that diplomats could not fashion rules regarding the laws and customs of war, leaving the military free to interpret the laws of warfare as they p\eased. See Cassese, supra note 124, at 195.
131. Although Cassese argues that Martens' references in the clause may have been a political expedient to appease the Belgians, Martens' belief in a limited natural law depiction of human rights foreshadows the "objective law" view of Scelle: "These [human] rights flow from the natnre and from the conditions of humanity and so cannot be created by legislation. [Vol. 23:3 international tribunal and truth-gathering organization, a job believed to be better left to historians. As noted previously, the 1907 Hague Convention restated and reiterated the 1899 Martens Clause to call for a broader reading of positive law as expressed through principles and the laws of humanity, beyond the written word articulated in the codification completed during the 1899 and 1907 Conferences. The continued interaction among institutional actors, such as other delegates who accepted the terminology of and purpose behind the Martens Clause, allowed for its repeated use through the 1919 Peace Conference and its internalization by representatives of States Parties. 134 It was of particular import to the Commission that during the 1907 negotiations, the German representative had taken a stance on the importance of international principles as guiding state actions. Rather than focus on formulating specific language for each eventuality, that representative had stated that certain acts would not be taken by the German Navy, not because of the codification undertaken by the Conference, but because such actions would be contrary to the unwritten law ofhumanity.
135
That the German Navy used submarine mines during World War 1-the very act that the German representative had stated need not be specifically forbidden by treaty 136 -was not lost to the participants in the 1919 Peace Conference. The Commission appeared to take particular offense that "those Powers . . . a short time before had on two occasions at The Hague protested their reverence for right and their respect for the principles of humanity," had fully reversed position and committed those very acts only a decade later.
137
The understanding that, on some level, nations had accepted the idea of a transnational unwritten law of humanity allowed the commission to decide that "the public conscience insists upon a sanction which will put clearly in the light that it is not permitted cynically to profess a disdain for the most sacred laws and the most formal undertakings."
138 However strong the desire was for an international sanction against Germany's war crime, There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense of duty imposed by the principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it, will always fulfill in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and civilization.").
136. 
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DEFYING GRAVITY 459 the Commission was frustrated by the fact that the Hague Conventions had not set up a mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of a premeditated war of aggression. 139 Instead, the Commission was only able to recommend, based on the gravity of the outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith, that certain acts "be the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference," and that "for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against the elementary principles ofinternationallaw."
140
Due to past interactions and the development of standards over the course of the previous half-century, the Commission's treatment of laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity could be, and was, much broader than its treatment of aggressive war. The Commission concluded that "[a]ll persons belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution."
141 This marked a remarkable shift since a decade ago, there was reluctance in putting into place international tribunals to prosecute war crimes.
The Commission went even further, not limiting its recommendations with regard to international criminal prosecution to only those actually committing war crimes. In addition to the parties culpable for breaches of the laws of humanity, the Commission report added responsibility for those who failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war, which included some of the highest ranking military leaders and officials of the German government.
142
During the course of the war, politicians and lawyers had called for the punishment of not just the immediate perpetrators but also of those with some degree of command responsibility.
143 However, at the war's end, all 139. Id. (stating that a suddenly declared war under false pretexts is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history will condemn, but by reason of the purely optional character of the institutions at The Hague for the maintenance of peace (International Commission of Inquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully brought before a tribunal such as the Commission is authorized to consider under its terms of reference.). 140. Id. at 120. Again, the Commission considers the gravity of the outrages on the principles of international law or the law of nations as creating sufficient reason for future penal action.
141. Id. at 117. 142. Id. at 121. 143. See Gamer, supra note 119, at 88-89 (citing 39 REVUE PENITENTIAIRE 457 (1915) (according to Professor Weiss of the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, "I think ... that not only the direct immediate offenders should be held responsible, but tl!at we must go to the top; we must pass over the heads of the primary offenders, to the chiefs, to those of whom the soldiers and officers have been only the servants and valets.")).
parties were waiting to see whether the international community would maintain the will to actually prosecute that broad range of individuals. 144 Some noted that Kaiser William II had instigated the war and believed his stepping down and trial would be good for international justice and morality, and would also benefit the German people in terms of having an international reckoning for a key player in starting the war. 145 The Commission held firm in its recommendation for a broad reach of potential war crimes culpability, encouraging its application for the first time to political leaders as wel1. 146 Despite the strength of the Commission report, there were some doubts as to the wisdom of allowing international prosecution of war criminals. Even among the Allies in favor of the Commission report, some nationals questioned the logic of this submissive sovereignty -an international court may be prone to engage in overreach in making those decisions relating to imprisonment that were typically within the purview of the sovereign. 147 Respected scholars were incredulous at the idea a sovereign would allow international tribunals of third states or enemy states to judge deeds typically left to the national courts. 144. See, e.g., James F. Willis, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISIDNG WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 51 (Greenwood Press 1982)(citing France's statement to Germany of October 4, 1918: "Conduct which is equally contrary to international law and the fundamental principles of all human civilization will not go unpunished .... The authors and directors of these crimes will be held responsible morally, judicially, and financially. They will seek in vain to escape the inexorable expiation which awaits them.").
145. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting former U.S. President Howard Taft stating, "William was behind it all the time," and former U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Hodges Choate hoping the war would "put an end to this Imperial Dynasty and give the people of Germany a chance.").
146. Despite these concerns, the Commission suggested two mechanisms of prosecution. First, each belligerent would have the power to set up, or use from its current system, an appropriate domestic trial venue that would enforce international norms.
149 Second, the Peace Conference could create a high tribunal to try special cases, including (1) defendants belonging to enemy countries that have committed outrages against civilians and soldiers of several Allied nations; (2) persons in authority whose orders affected the conduct of operations against several of the Allied armies; (3) all civil or military authorities of enemy countries, regardless of rank, who ordered or failed to prevent violations of the laws or customs of war/ 50 and (4) such other persons who were most appropriately tried before an international tribunal.
151 Of note, the high tribunal would also have preference over national courts for the same offence, have the ability to transfer cases to national courts for inquiry or for trial and judgment, and would allow for prosecutorial discretion in case selection. 152 The Commission stated that the tribunal would apply "the principles of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience. Violations of human rights belong with crimes such as terrorism, narcoticstrafficking, and destabilizing democratic governments, in a category of deeds which may, because of their magnitude, exceed the capacity of national courts to handle internally .... But if the establishment of international courts seems impossible, intermediate solutions could be implemented, such as the internationalization of jurisdiction, and the refusal of foreign courts to recognize amnesties, pardons, or special statutes of limitations for these kinds of crimes. 149. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (stating that each belligerent had the right to form "an appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases ... [which] would be able to try the incriminated persons according to their own procedure, and much complication and consequent delay would be avoided which would arise if all such cases were to be brought before a single tribunal"). Again, this follows the recommendation and model law of the 1880 Manual of the Laws of War on Land, supra note 81.
150. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 121 (authorizing trial of "all authorities, civil or military, belonging to enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank, including the heads of states, who ordered, or, with knowledge thereof and with power to intervene, abstained from preventing or taking measures to prevent, putting an end to or repressing, violations of the laws or customs of war).
151. Id. at121-22. 152. Id. at 122. For example, the Commission plan states "the duty of selecting the cases for trial before the tribunal and of directing and conducting prosecutions before it shall be imposed upon a Prosecuting Commission of five members ...."
153. Id.
punishments as may be imposed for such an offence or offences by any court in any country represented on the tribunal or in the country of the convicted person." 154 Looking at the list of crimes reported by the Commission, the crimes are neither divided between war crimes and crimes against humanity, nor are they systematically compiled. 155 Instead, the list is illustrative of "diverse" and "painful" crimes, with additions "daily and continually being made."
156 None of the European powers serving on the Commission sought to challenge this fairly expansive power. The Martens Clause had matured into settled law for the states that had participated in the conferences leading to the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
157
E. Challenges to the 1919 Commission Report
In its challenges to the Commission Report, the US delegates raised a number of issues deriving from a claimed distinction between legal and moral obligations: the United States noted that "[t]he laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of nations," while the "laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual," preventing them from being considered in a court ofjustice, particularly in the administration of criminallaw. 158 Rather than vindicating 154. Id. 155. Sandoz, supra note 108, at 668-69 (arguing that the list, while "somewhat interesting historically, . . . cannot be viewed as the result of a serious and systematic work of scholarship carried out to show established doctrine or state practice.").
156. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 113-115. 157. Although only ten ofthe fifteen signatories to the 1907 Hague Convention served on the Commission on Responsibilities, eight of the ten-all but the United States and Japanrecognized the Commission's Majority Report without reservation.
158. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 134 (the United States representatives here distinguish between responsibilities of a legal nature and those of a moral nature). See also id. at 128. But see id. at 136 (arguing to the political question of sovereignty and head of state immunity); id at 139-140 (distinguishing to the submission of a non-binding commission of inquiry for aggressive war, to the extent anybody can investigate and distinguish between an aggressive and defensive posture, and to note that such a body would be responding to a moral and not legal question); cf id. at 146 (noting that tribunals to hear war crimes must consider only war crimes over which the individual states already have jurisdiction, as there was "no international statute or convention making a violation of the laws and customs of war-not to speak of the laws or principles of humanity-an international crime, affixing a punishment to it, and declaring the court which has jurisdiction over the offence"); cf id. at 147 (noting the United States was "averse to the creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a new penalty, which would be ex post facto in nature, and thus contrary to the Constitution of the United States and in conflict with the law and practice of civilized communities"); cf id. at 148 (noting that heads of state who violate the laws and customs of war "are, as agents of the people, in whom the sovereignty of the state resides, responsible to the people for the illegal acts which they may have committed, and that they are not and that they should not be made responsible to any other sovereignty"); cf id. at 129, 149 (stating that a head of state is morally, but not legally, rights that exist according to the laws or principles of humanity--a. term negotiated, adopted, and utilized within a European context--the United States looked to apply the written laws of the parties regarding their own courts applying penal laws to enemy belligerents. 159 The Japanese delegates similarly questioned whether international law recognized a penal law for a belligerent presumed guilty of a crime against the laws and customs of war, but appeared to challenge only the inclusion of heads of state in those to be charged under high tribunal, and the punishment for failure to "abstain[] from preventing or taking measures to prevent, put[] an end to, or repress[] acts in violation of the laws and customs ofwar."
160 Thus, while the European members of the Commission on Responsibility looked to interpretations of law developed through and internalized following the Brussels Declaration and Hague Conventions, the United States and Japan did not recognize the developments as having achieved the standard of law in a strict sense.
Eventually, following the first World War, the Allied governments decided to limit their requests, "only want[ing] to make an example. To try very large numbers would be to create great difficulties for the German Government," which some states viewed as easier to work with than a potential Bolshevist or Militarist Government. 161 State leaders shifted the membership of the Inter-Allied Mixed Commission 162 from legal experts to those who would assist in the political expedient of selecting a number of cases for Germany to conduct, "to uphold moral principles and treaty rights." 163 While maintaining the commission structure, this signified the move toward a political solution over a legal one, moving away from legal concepts such as deterrence of, retribution against, and reparations from individual perpetrators toward recognition of culpability and reparations by the state. Thus, while states recognized the harm done by the parties responsible to mankind, such that the authority of the Commission was circumscribed by its mandate: to report on "facts as to the violations of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and its allies ...").
159. Commission Report, supra note 135, at 135. . 161. Willis, supra note 144, at ll7 (referencing the English view that the Allies should seek the surrender of "the most important and notorious offenders and let the rest go," and the French view to commence with "a few symbolic persons."). While even a shortened list of Germans sought by the Allies for trial had 1,580 alleged offenders on it, compromise among the Allies brought the list down to 890. Eventually, the Allies allowed Germany to try an almost negligible number of alleged war criminals.
162. The Inter-Allied Mixed Commission was formed to "collect, publish and communicate to Germany details of the accusations made against each of the responsible persons" for war crimes during World War I. 
[Vol. 23:3 defeated during the war and could specify the criminal nature of that harm such that a majority of those states could agree to the propriety of criminal sanctions, political and economic expediency allowed the states to, in large part, step away from criminal process in response to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
F. The Nuremberg Charter ofthe International Military Tribunal
Thus far, we have seen that Europe and increasingly, other world powers develop penalties for crimes engaged in during a conflict use war and legal issues raised through the conflict to crystallize legal questions regarding rights and responsibilities of parties to the conflict. Following the first World War, most of the great Powers of Europe had recognized a legal standard, but were unwilling or unable to enforce that standard.
The twentieth-century saw the rise of a voluntary-positivist view of international law -law as an expression of the will of the state, based in a specific, legally cognizable source on which the state representative might rely. 164 In applying international law, the international community had to decide what weight to give arguments stating that a law reached customary status, or reflected a general principle. 165 This happens whether the international community can interpret international law through a designated international body, or allows for interpretation of the law to The common view that international law must be created solely by States is, therefore, not valid to-day-nor indeed has it ever been .... [New International Law's] point of depaliure is that, to-day, States are increasingly interdependent: and that consequently they do not form a simple community, as formerly, but rather a veritable international and organized society. This society in nowise abolishes the independence and the sovereignty of the States, nor their legal equality (Aliicle 2 paragraph 1, of the Chalier); but it limits this sovereignty, and the rights which flow therefrom, in view of the general interests of this society.
In accordance with the Preamble to the Chalier, the new organization-and consequently, the new law which flows therefrom-must have the following ends in view: to maintain peace, to consider the general interest, to safeguard fundamental human rights, to promote co-operation between States, to bring their interests into harmony, to promote economic, social, intellectual and humanitarian progress. 166 Independent sources of international law include treaty law, customary international law, and general principles of law, with decisions of jurists and writings of scholars take on a supportive role in understanding the law. 167 These sources are a minimum -that is, courts may look to these sources and give them weight, notwithstanding arguments made by a party before the court that a particular source is not properly law. 168 The dynamics underpinning all of these sources of law were hotly debated at the end of World War II, 169 when the question of what international criminal justice mechanisms were desirable, available, and enforceable loomed large.
The victorious states, as the United Nations, 170 prepared for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the end of World War II. The US delegate to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Herbert Pell, sought retribution for atrocities committed against people on racial or religious grounds based on the application of the "laws of humanity" and suggested crimes committed against persons based on their race or religion constituted "crimes against humanity."
171
British prosecutor Hartley Shawcross noted that crimes against humanity were different in kind from the crime against peace and the ordinary war crime. To a certain extent, the crime was carried out as part of the Nazi Party's total war policy, thereby raising international issues of [Vol. 23:3 human rights abuse was framed quite differently from the crime against humanity claims brought before the Nuremberg Tribunal. 191 The 1993 and 1994 International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter, the "ICTY") and for Rwanda (hereinafter, the "ICTR"), respectively, split the difference in terms of their treatment of crimes against humanity for jurisdictional purposes. The ICTY Statute required that the perpetrator commit the crime against humanity during an armed conflict, but expanded the definition of the crime to include "other inhumane acts," such that the list no longer purports to be exhaustive.
192
The ICTR Statute, on the other hand, did not require that crimes against humanity occur during armed conflict, but that the perpetrator must "commit [the crime] as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds ....
,!93
The International Law Commission continued to develop and codify the laws allowing for the prosecution of these international crimes, with additional changes. The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind requires that a crime against humanity be "committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and [be] instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group." 194 The International Law Commission commentary to the Draft Code claims to apply "the Charter of the Nlirnberg Tribunal, as interpreted and applied by the Niirnberg Tribunal, taking into account subsequent developments in international law since Ni.irnberg."
195
Instead of relying on the standard requiring a massive human rights violation to qualify as a crime against humanity, as indicated in the 1991 Code, the 1996 Code points out that the Nazi policy of terror was "certainly carried out on a vast scale," in order to suggest that, if the crime is not systemic, but is widespread, it can still qualify as a crime against humanity. 196 This mirrors the type of standard and language used since the of states through their state governments. Assuming that the state has an obligation in the international sphere to enforce the international understanding of crimes against humanity and a responsibility to protect individuals within its borders from international crimes, it is unclear in this fragmented model which definition would apply. It could be the Draft Code as custom derived from state practice by the International Law Commission, or the Rome Statute as Treaty and the customary law adopted by over 120 states, or even the international tribunals created by the Security Council that have been in existence for nearly twenty years.
III. MOVING FORWARD: THE ROLE AND OBLIGATION OF NATIONAL COURTS
Previous parts of this Article outlined some of the failures of the ICC to live up to its potential and have traced the historical patterns that suggest that the ICC will continue to narrow its jurisdictional scope. This part offers potential solutions by considering how the current quandary surrounding ICC complementarity and definitions of gravity can motivate national courts to prosecute war crimes and engage in essential norm-setting behavior that will resonate on both the national and international level.
The fact that ICC jurisdictional standards are still malleable creates the opportunity for national leaders and agents, judges, and nongovernmental organizations to demand a decrease in barriers when seeking a remedy, a greater number of trials, and the implementation of laws of the ICC as the law of the state by seeking the adoption of terms broader than that of the ICC statute as legislation within the state. While the perceived lack of legitimacy of national courts may indeed be an issue, the national courts' implementation of a lower threshold to entry than that of the ICC may be the only manner to effect both the underlying purpose of the Court, and to create a body of law from which other international criminal cases can begin the process of interaction anew.
In addition, the international community has evolved in not only recognizing a duty under international law to prosecute international crimes as defined by international law, but also a responsibility to protect our populations from the very harms caused by atrocity crimes. 202 In addition to the obligation to give effect to criminal law recognized in the Rome Statute, the United Nations has recognized that primary protection falls to the state with secondary responsibility exercisable by the international community through the UN Security Council. 203 This secondary right in the international community to invest in state security even against national will is also exercisable through the Security Council, which can refer matters to the ICC, and delay the matter's consideration in the interest of international peace and security. 204 In the meantime, the progressive narrowing of the ICC jurisdiction has the potential to wreak immediate and problematic effects. For example, while the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa may continue for years to come/ 05 actions surrounding the ICC have also given some evidence of compliance pull in the application of amnesty laws in U ganda? 06 In communications with the ICC, Uganda was able to pass an amnesty law for the largest portion of those involved in regional conflict, while retaining the ICC as a reserve court? 07 If that decision does not work to Uganda's benefit, the compliance pull for such an act will decrease, and the Court will not establish a norm in support of similar negotiations?
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[Vol. 23:3 short, the crimes against humanity that may be occurring in the course of this conflict will go unpunished, and the lack of criminal liability will only embolden future perpetrators of atrocity crimes.
A. Decoupling International and National Mechanisms for the Prevention ofHarms
As there is a duality of international and national interest in the protection against atrocity crimes, there cannot be a clear demarcation between responsibilities for the prevention of these international harms, as the protection is one recognized by international law for the benefit of the individual. However, the proposed complementarity requires a demarcation between the opportunity for state jurisdiction and international jurisdiction in the punishment of these crimes. Although both the international and national communities have interests in the outcome and the protection of persons subject to these crimes, the outcome should not be determinative on the mechanisms used.
B. International Purposes vs. National Purposes
Looking at the question of the extent to which national courts served an international purpose, on the eve of the British election in October 1918, Lord Finlay, the Lord Chancellor, said to an Inter-Allied Parliamentary Committee: "Britain had 'two aims in this war. One of them was the punishment of those who could be proved guilty of outrages,' and 'the other was reparation for the wrongs that had been done.' Prosecution of 'offenders would not be mere vengeance; it would be the vindication of international morality. '" 209 The question of control by the state apparatus of mechanisms to prevent the international crimes described in the Rome Treaty goes to the core of complementarity. As previously discussed, there exist numerous reasons that a local trial under the authority of a state with an interest in the outcome of the case would be preferable to an international trial. Only when the state exercising primary jurisdiction proves unable or unwilling to engage in genuine investigations or trials would the international tribunal levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allow Uganda a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators). In addition to support for norm creation through a transnational/supranational dialogue, the negotiations recognize different levels of criminality and gravity in the International Criminal Law sphere, and allows Uganda a voice in managing some of the lower level perpetrators. See also Ewald, supra note 43, at 396; Baylis, supra note 31, at 44 (arguing that the adoption of the Rome Statute in certain cases in the Democratic Republic of Congo "is not an isolated importation of international law by the domestic system ... [but is part of the] multiple, overlapping international-national interactions aimed at the more far-reaching goal of promoting postconflict justice by rebuilding the national justice system.").
209. See Willis, supra note 144, at 53.
consider the admissibility of the case for international adjudication. In attempting to prevent international harms, the state, as an entity in itself with responsibilities to its constituents, and as a member of the international community with responsibilities to the constituents of that community, may have different resources, limitations, and strengths than those available to an entity such as the ICC. The state-level apparatus will more likely have a clearly differentiated system of a judiciary, legislature, and executive.
All aspects of the state may have an interest in the outcome: some in responding to constituent concerns for vindication (perhaps as indicative of justice -i.e., the justice system will vindicate the rights of various classes of people), some in response to stability (either through prevention of escalation, or through maintenance of power structures that support the status quo within the state, or minimize individual needs or desires of various parties within the state), and some in application of their own authorities within the state (responsive executive desirous of recognition to a problem that a court cannot respond to with adequate alacrity)?
10 Some have argued that the international community attempts to replicate the governmental structures such that nothing immunizes the ICC from the concerns raised within a state structure. 210. The writings of Georges Scelle on the penneability of the do maine reservti responds to this. A counterargument to state access to protection for those threatened by atrocities is now, and has always been, the concept of a domaine reserve -the space in which the state can distance itself from the encroachment of the international community. When the international community comes together and relinquishes authorities previously within the power of individual states to accomplish an international or transnational aim, the community creates a supranational system. In order for the system to function, there must be an agreement that the participants will follow the rule oflaw as expressed by the community. The government of a state must often represent the state in its international dealings, creating a dual role: both representing the interests of the constituents of the state, and representing a participant in the joint undertaking in a transnational sphere. Some international undertakings allow for or, indeed, require the actions of entities within a state system. One such example is the complementarity envisioned by the ICC Statute -while the international community responds to issues of concern, it does so because the actions are violative of both the international interest in the shared undertaking, as well as the constituents' individual interests. Scelle argues against states, such as the United States, that has an overbroad reading of the domaine reserve. See Scelle, supra note 88.
211. Scelle, supra note 88, at 358 ("Social functions must be fulfilled in international collectives just as in national collectives, or the phenomenon of solidarity would rapidly disaggregate and the social tie would founder." [il faut que les fonctions sociales soient remplies dans les collectivites internationales comme dans les collectivites internes, sans quoi le phenomene de solidarite desagregerait rapidement et le lien social pericliterait]). Scelle gives examples of the various branches of a state government acting with an international motive. [Vol. 23:3
C. Why National Courts Must Act
National courts were envisioned to be the primary actors in prosecuting international atrocity crimes and enforcing the growing global consensus that human rights norms must be protected and promoted. Although they are not currently fulfilling this role, their importance in establishing a strong framework of international criminal justice should not be understated.
As discussed, the state is well-positioned to take on this role: the preparation for the ICC planned around the concept of a reserve court; the complementarity provisions recognize a much more robust and active international community acting through national courts; and national courts are in at least as good a position to express the will of the States Parties to the ICC Statute as the ICC itself, until such time as the ICC has clarified its interpretation of the interpretive issues surrounding the crimes within its jurisdiction. This is particularly true where there exists a gap between what the ICC purports to do, and what the Statute requires the member states to do in conjunction with the Court. The application of international criminal law has been, to a certain extent, a gap-filling exercise -allowing for us to recognize the imperfections in our protective processes, and to then better articulate standards and processes to close the gaps. However, there are times where the international community recognizes a gap that fails to protect a class originally considered for protection by legal process.
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Given the opportunity to protect that group, where parties do not reach an agreement on how to best do so, or whether it is in fact possible to do so, later arguments surrounding application and/or codification may lean towards implementing the gap as part of the law as accepted by states so as not to create new laws on which states have not agreed, or to expand on the laws recognized by states.
The application of the gravity standard by the ICC is paradigmatic; in raising what appears only an issue of complementarity, the ICC takes a risk by allowing state practice to redefine how crimes are prosecuted (or note prosecuted) within the ICC system. As noted, in the case of Bosco Ntaganda, the ICC's controlling admissibility by refusing to hear cases involving serious crimes unless the alleged perpetrator is among those most responsible puts the onus on states parties to do the same -a cascading effect of impunity that is precisely the opposite of what the Rome Statute strived toward. If national courts apply International Criminal Law terms broadly, applying the terms as they understand the terms and wish them understood, it will serve to bolster the ICC as an institution and norm-setting body, since the ICC will then be in a better position to rely on the judgments made at various levels of responsibility, and to recognize an international harm, even when the ICC cannot or would not hear the case at an international level.
CONCLUSION
Within the realm of atrocity crimes, no answer will serve as a panacea for all humanity's ills. That does not mean that we should not continue working toward as many remedies as possible. The ICC, by design, requires input from various levels -from States Parties, to individuals seeking investigations by sending communications to the Office of the Prosecutor, to other entities seeking to resolve conflicts.
Where the individual members of the international community rely on the Appellate Chamber to set rules for the gravity of a harm subject to remedy, or allow for decisions to be relayed between the International Law Commission, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the leaders of States, individuals will have no voice in the international planning that would protect so many from systematic or widespread violence. Only by redoubling our efforts -through our legislatures, through our executive, through our courts, and through ourselves -will the international community be able to respond to our needs.
